NOTE
TEFRA'S RESPONSE TO SHORT-TERM
ABUSES OF INSURANCE ANNUITY
POLICIES
I
INTRODUCTION

In modem times, Congress has tried repeatedly to allow and even to help
taxpayers plan for their retirement through the use of tax-favored long-term
investment vehicles. Once any plan receives tax-favored status, however, any
short-term tax sheltering properties that it may have are ultimately discovered
and exploited. This note offers annuity plans as a case in point, and examines
congressional efforts to remedy these abuses. In part II, this note examines
annuity policies and the tax shelters they provided to help taxpayers plan for
their retirement, which were later abused for their tax-sheltering nature by
short-term investors. Part III examines efforts by Congress to remedy such
abuses and whether those remedies were sufficient to close the loopholes.
Part IV concludes that loopholes for short-term investors still exist in the
Internal Revenue Code and can be exploited by carefully drafted universal life
insurance plans.
II
EXPLOITATION OF ANNUITY

POLICIES UNDER PRE-TEFRA LAw

Before the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA),'
Internal Revenue Code section 72 granted highly favorable tax treatment to
annuity contracts. During the period between the time the policyholder paid
the first premium and the annuity starting date, the annuity owner was not
taxed on the earnings the insurance company accumulated on his paid-in
premiums. Taxation of interest and other current earnings on a
policyholder's investment in an insurance annuity was deferred until annuity
payments were received or amounts characterized as income were withdrawn.
When a policyholder received an annuity payment, a portion of that payment
was taxed as ordinary income under an "exclusion ratio," computed to divide
the payment into a portion intended to reflect the protected nontaxable
return of investment in the contract and a portion intended to reflect the
taxable growth of the investment. 2
Copyright 0 1985 by Law and Contemporary Problems
1. Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 265, 96 Stat. 324, 544.
2. See I.R.C. § 72(b) (Lawyers Co-op. 1984).
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A policyholder also received highly favorable tax treatment on withdrawals
made before the annuity starting date. Amounts paid out under a contract
before the annuity payments began, such as payments upon loans, partial
surrender, or liquidation of a contract, were first treated as a return of the
policyholder's capital. Such amounts were taxable as ordinary income only
after, and to the extent that, all of the policyholder's investment in the
contract, computed as the sum of all premiums paid, had been recovered. 3
Additionally, there was no provision assessing a tax penalty for withdrawals or
for surrenders effected before the annuity starting date or before the
policyholder reached the age specified in the contract.
The legislative history of TEFRA reveals congressional dissatisfaction with
the abuses of insurance annuity contracts. Such contracts had begun to
manifest a radical departure from the policy considerations underlying the
favorable tax treatment afforded insurance annuities under pre-TEFRA law.
Traditionally, annuity contracts were regarded as safe and conservative, albeit
low-yielding, investments purchased by individuals who wanted to provide for
a steady source of income during their retirement and to insure themselves
against the possibility of outliving their assets. Monies invested in such
annuity plans were afforded favorable tax treatment as an incentive for people
to avail themselves of the recognized legitimate advantages of annuity
contracts and to provide themselves with income security during their mature
years .4
In recent years, however, the uses of annuity contracts have reflected
numerous abuses of the protections granted to such plans under the tax law,
demonstrating a marked shift in the use of insurance annuities from provision
for long-term security for retirement to ordinary investment purposes, the
latter being undertaken in annuity form solely because of the favorable tax
treatment afforded such contracts. Notably, investors began to take
advantage of these policies by making tax-exempt withdrawals from their
accounts before the starting date of the policy. Congressional hearings
revealed that the insurance industry had been actively marketing annuity
contracts as a mechanism for obtaining favorable tax treatment by
emphasizing the benefits of the tax deferral during the accumulation period,
the tax-favored treatment of partial surrenders, and options for lump-sum
settlements. 5 While it has been commonly understood that the notions of tax
shelters and protective devices for long-term economic security are properly
linked, tax-favored status has been granted to the latter specifically for the
purpose of protecting retirement income. 6 Congress has manifested a
willingness to endorse tax shelters for annuity and insurance policies to the
extent that they serve the long-term goals of providing individuals with a
3. See
4. See
781, 1085.
5. See
6. See

id § 72(e).
S. REp. No. 494,97th Cong., 2d Sess. 350, reprinted in 1982 U.S.

CODE CONG.

id.
S. Rap. No. 494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. at 350, reprinted in 1982 U.S.

NEws at 1087.
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source of income for their retirement years or the equally laudable end of
7
protecting family members in the event of the death of the policyholder.
What was objectionable about many of the pre-TEFRA policies was that they
were being tied to relatively small amounts of insurance protection or
retirement provisions solely to get tax-free build-up. In effect, plans that were
orginally intended to serve as protective devices for long-term economic
security were advertised, and increasingly used by policyholders, as short8
term investments to exploit their tax-sheltered status.
III
TEFRA
A.

Rationale Behind the Law

The legislative history of TEFRA indicates that Congress enacted it with
two intentions. First, and specifically with regard to annuity plans, Congress
was clearly concerned with escalating use of such plans as tax shelters and
sought to remedy these abuses. To address this issue, Congress placed a
renewed emphasis on the employment of annuities as a tax-sheltered
mechanism only to the extent that they provide for long-range savings for
retirement security. In approving the TEFRA provisions limiting the tax
advantages granted to annuity contracts, Congress "believe[d] that the use of
deferred annuity contracts to meet long-term investment goals, such as
income security, [was] still a worthy ideal. However, [Congress] believe[d]
that their use for short-term investment and income tax deferral should be
discouraged." 9 These provisions, then, are intended to serve as a disincentive
to individuals using such plans as tax shelters exclusively for short-term
purposes, while still providing tax benefits to policyholders using annuities in
their intended and legitimate manner.
Additionally, TEFRA's general revenue objectives were a motivating factor
behind the law's new treatment of annuity plans. The sections of TEFRA
limiting beneficial tax treatment of insurance annuity contracts fall within the
Act's revenue provisions. The goals of the revenue provisions include the
raising of funds in an effort to narrow the budget deficits which had resulted
from prior spending and tax policies, and the desire to increase tax equity by
"scaling back or repealing those tax preferences which [were] no longer
needed or which [could] no longer be justified in light of the present
budgetary situation." 10 The projected revenue effects of the legislative
enactments concerning the tax treatment of insurance annuities reflect

7.
8.

9.
10.

Id, reprinted in 1982 U.S.

CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
Id, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
Id, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
Id. at 97, reprintedin 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.

at 1187.
at 1187.

at 1187.
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Congress' intent that TEFRA provisions dealing with annuity contracts serve
as revenue-raising efforts. "I
In accordance with the policy objectives of the TEFRA provisions limiting
the beneficial tax treatment granted to holders of annuity contracts, the
statutory changes are not intended to affect the tax treatment of amounts
received as annuity payments after the annuity starting date. Rather, the Act
seeks to preserve the tax benefits granted to insurance annuities used as longrange planning tools, but changes the effectiveness as short-term investment
vehicles used to avoid ordinary tax treatment. TEFRA's two principal
modifications of the tax treatment of annuity contracts relate to withdrawals
of funds made before the starting date specified in the contract. First, the Act
provides that partial surrenders or cash withdrawals prior to the annuity
starting date are treated as income to the extent that the cash value of the
contract exceeds the investment in the contract. 12 The Act also imposes a
13
penalty on certain distributions made from an annuity contract.
B.

TEFRA Changes in Section 72

Section 72(e) of the Internal Revenue Code deals with the taxation of
withdrawals from the policies and was amended under TEFRA to eliminate
the preferential tax treatment of preannuity payments afforded to
policyholders under prior law. The Act reverses pre-TEFRA law regarding
early withdrawals and generally provides that amounts received before the
annuity starting date will be treated first as withdrawals of income earned on
the investment to the extent of such income. Any amount received before the
annuity starting date which falls within the ambit of section 72(e) is "included
in gross income to the extent allocable to income on the contract."' 14 To the
extent the amount received is allocable to the investment in the contract, it is
15
not included in gross income.
"Income on the contract" is computed by starting with the cash value of
the contract (which includes all the premiums paid and the accumulated
interest credited to the policyholder's account, without deducting any
surrender charge assessed by the company) immediately prior to the time the
amount is to be received. The cash value is then reduced by the investment in
the contract to arrive at the "income on the contract."' 16 If no previous
withdrawals have been made, a taxpayer can easily obtain this figure by
calculating the accumulated interest which the insurance company has
credited to his account and on which no tax has been paid.
11. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 760, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 691, reprintedin 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 1190, 1454 (life insurance and annuity provisions of TEFRA were expected to bring in
$1.9 billion in 1983, increasing to $3.4 billion in 1987).
12. I.R.C. § 72(e)(3)(A) (Lawyers Co-op. 1984).
13. Id. § 72(q)(amended 1984).
14. Id. § 72(e)(2)(B)(i).
15. Id. § 72(e)(2)(B)(ii).
16. Id. § 72(e)(3)(A).
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"Investment in the contract" is calculated by subtracting from the
"aggregate amount of premiums or other consideration paid for the contract"
the "aggregate amount received under the contract before" the present
disbursement, "to the extent that such amount was excludable from gross
income under" current or prior income tax law. 17 Investment in the contract,
in simpler terms, can be viewed as the policyholder's net cost of the contract,
as long as the amounts previously received as income on the contract are not
subtracted from the total amount that the policyholder has paid.
Thus, a premature distribution of less than the "income on the contract"
(or cash value minus investment in the contract) is considered income.' 8 A
premature distribution in excess of the "income on the contract" is considered
a tax-free return on investment. 19 Simply put, withdrawals are allocated first
to income and then to investment.
The Act provides that loans or pledges made against an annuity contract
are treated the same as cash withdrawals for purposes of the new rule.2 0 Such
amounts, then, are subject to the above provisions and are taxable as ordinary
income to the extent allocated to income on the contract.
TEFRA also assesses a penalty on certain distributions from an annuity
contract. Section 72(q) of the Code, as revised, imposes a 5% penalty on
certain premature distributions from annuity contracts, but only with respect
to earnings attributable to premiums paid after August 1982. This penalty is
assessed on the total amount withdrawn to the extent that such amount is
includable in income 2 ' and is properly allocable to any investment in the
contract made during the ten year period ending on the date such amount was
received by the taxpayer.2 2 For these purposes, a first-in, first-out system of
allocation is used. In other words, the amount includable in income for
section 72(q) purposes is allocated to the earliest premium paid for the
23
annuity to which includable income has not been previously assigned.
Thus, only income which is derived from premiums paid in the last ten years
is penalized. 2 4 No penalty is imposed on the withdrawal of funds allocated to
investment in the contract.
To illustrate these provisions, assume that an annual premium annuity
contract is purchased after 1982. Further assume that after twelve years of
paying annual premiums, the first year's premium has accrued earnings of
$2,000, the second year's $1,800, and the third year's $1,500. If the annuitant
then decides to make an early withdrawal of $5,000 from his policy, the entire
$5,000 will be included as income under section 72(e) since income on the
contract exceeds the amount withdrawn. For section 72(q) purposes,
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id § 72(e)(6).
Id § 72(e)(3)(A).
See id §72(e)(3)(B).
See id § 72(e)(4)(A).
See supra text accompanying note 16.
I.R.C. § 72(q)(1)(A) (Lawyers Co-op. 1984)(amended 1984).
Id § 72(q)(1)(B)(amended 1984).
Id § 72(q)(1)(A)(amended 1984).
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however, only amounts withdrawn before ten years have elapsed will be
penalized. Since section 7 2(q) uses a first-in, first-out allocation basis, the first
$3,800 is exempt from the penalty tax. Only $1,200 of the total $5,000 withdrawal is considered withdrawn from income earned within the last ten years,
and is thus subject to the 5% penalty tax.
The new law expressly provides for several exceptions to the penalty
provisions. No penalty is assessed on distributions made once the
policyholder reaches age fifty-nine and one-half years, distributions
attributable to the policyholder's becoming disabled, distributions made to a
beneficiary after the death of the policyholder, or distributions from
qualifying pension plans. In addition, the penalty does not apply to a
payment which is one of a series of substantially equal periodic payments
25
made for life or for at least five years.
TEFRA has effectively modified the Code provisions regarding the
taxation of early withdrawals from annuity contracts to discourage the use of
such plans as short-term investment vehicles, while still providing a tax
incentive to those individuals wishing to use annuities for the legitimate
purpose of ensuring long-range income security. The law, in general, has
retained the favorable tax benefits conferred on monies invested in annuity
contracts and has limited the permissiveness of tax treatment only with regard
to those payments which constitute early withdrawals. By characterizing the
initial premature withdrawals as income which is fully taxable, the Act
currently exacts a charge for the superior liquidity of traditional annuity
policies. The additional 5% penalty serves as a further disincentive to shortterm policy investors while being reasonable enough to allow the investor
access to his investment for an individual emergency which would not qualify
as one of the statutory exceptions. The five statutory exceptions to the
penalty can hardly be faulted as constituting potential bases for circumventing
the general rule; the number of investors who qualify for such exemptions is
likely to be de minimis. Moreover, the stated exemptions represent
understandable and compassionate congressional policies and priorities for
extreme cases of human hardship.
IV
LIMITATIONS ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE

TEFRA

CHANGES

Section 72(e)(5) provides for the retention of pre-TEFRA rules under
27
existing contracts 26 and under life insurance and endowment contracts.
The subsection dealing with life insurance and endowment contracts,
however, imposes no ironclad rule regarding the treatment of such plans,
since Congress has stipulated that pre-TEFRA treatment will apply "[e]xcept
to the extent prescribed by the Secretary by regulations." 2 8 Section
25. Id § 7 2(q)(2).
26. Id. § 72(e)(5)(B).
27. Id. § 72(e)(5)(C).
28.

Id
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72(e)(5)(C), then, leaves open the possibility that the TEFRA restrictions on
annuities can be avoided by prudent investors who hold tax beneficial life
insurance policies rather than annuity contracts. This section examines the
mechanics of universal life policies and inquires whether, by investing in such
plans, the limitations imposed by TEFRA can successfully be avoided.
A.

The Mechanics of Universal Life Policies

A universal life insurance policy, also known as a flexible premium life or
adjustable life insurance contract, is a single contract which reflects a
composite of a renewable term policy and annuity or accumulation account.
Once the policy is activated, the term policy and the accumulation account
each operate independently. Universal life insurance policies are notable
primarily for their flexibility; the amounts and frequency of the premium
payments are determined by the policyholder and may be increased or
decreased at any time. He or she may switch back and forth between whole
life and term coverage, and may increase or decrease the amount of coverage
as needed. The policyholder is at liberty to make unscheduled premium
payments at any time, and can specify the policy's maturity date while
29
retaining the right to change the date at will.
In addition to the benefits of universal life insurance policies which flow
directly from their flexibility, section 101 grants these policies the same
preferential tax treatment traditionally
afforded to life insurance
arrangements. Under section 101(a), earnings accumulate tax free and death
proceeds, which reflect both the true insurance benefit and the cash value of
the contract including the policyholder's investment and all interest credited
to his account, are passed to the beneficiary income tax free. Investments also
earn competitive interest and rates of return.
B.

Past Abuses of Universal Life

The flexibility of premium payments under universal life plans has often
had the effect of allowing the policies to turn into nothing but disguised
savings plans which, unlike other savings plans, qualified under section 101 (a)
for an income exemption for the beneficiary upon the death of the
policyholder. Decisions interpreting section 101(a) have required the
contract to possess an element of insurance risk to qualify as life insurance.3 0
Congress, aware of the potential abuses that flexible premium life insurance
contracts made available to investment oriented policyholders and cognizant
of their relatively increased desirability in light of the changes in TEFRA tax
treatment of annuities, sought to limit the availability of tax benefits
associated with such contracts. The legislature strove to find an appropriate
compromise between its interest in limiting the abusive use of universal life
insurance contracts and its general belief that "flexible premium life
29.
30.

E.g., I.R.S. Letter Ruling 81-16073 (Nov. 24, 1982).
See infra text accompanying note 63.
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insurance contracts should have the same tax treatment as traditional levelpremium whole life insurance contracts if they are substantially comparable to
traditional contracts." 3' As discussed in the next section, TEFRA retained the
provisions granting favorable tax treatment to insurance policies, but
established guidelines for treating universal life policies as tax-free life
insurance arrangements.
These provisions essentially require the
policyholder to diversify a risk through the insurance company's other
policyholders in order for the policy to fall under the statute.
C.

TEFRA Treatment of Universal Life

TEFRA provides that in order to be treated as a life insurance policy, a
flexible premium life insurance plan must at all times over the duration of the
contract satisfy one of two alternate requirements: (1) the sum of premiums
paid under the contract at any time cannot exceed a specially computed
"guideline premium limitation," 3 2 and any amount payable on the death of
the insured cannot be less than the "applicable percentage" of the contract's
cash value as of the date of death, 33 or (2) the cash value must not exceed the
"net single premium" for the death benefit at such time.3 4
For purposes of satisfying the first of the two alternate tests provided by
the Act, the "guideline premium limitation" 35 refers to the greater of "(i) the
guideline single premium, or (ii) the sum of the guideline level premiums to
such date."' 36 The "guideline single premium" is defined as a single premium
amount necessary to fund the contract (based on the contract's mortality
assumptions and interest at the greater of a rate of 6% or the rate guaranteed
by the contract).3 7 The "guideline level premium" is calculated as the sum of
level annual payments over the life of the contract (but not less than twenty
years from the issue date, or not later than age ninety-five, whichever is
earlier). This amount is to be computed in the same way as for the guideline
single premium, except that the interest rate used in the calculations for the
guideline level premium cannot be less than 4%.A
The term "applicable percentage" 3 9 requires that the death benefit under
the universal life contract must constitute 140% of the cash value until the
insured reaches age forty. The applicable percentage is thereafter reduced by
1% for each year after forty, but does not drop below 105%.4o Section 101
also articulates computational rules for the guideline premiums, which must
be used when making the above calculations to determine whether the tax
31. S. REP. No. 494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 350, 352, reprintedin 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 781, 1087.
32. I.R.C. § 101(f)(1)(A)(i) (Lawyers Co-op. 1984)(amended 1984).
33. Id § 101(f)(1)(A)(ii)(amended 1984).
34. Id § 101(f)(1)(B)(amended 1984).
35. Id § 101(f)(2)(A).
36. Id. § 101(f)(2)(A)(i)-(ii).
37. Id § 101(f)(2)(B).
38. Id § 101(f)(2)(C).
39. See id § 101(f)(1)(A)(ii)(amended 1984).
40. Id § 101(f)(3)(C).
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benefit requirements have been satisfied. 41 First, the net amount at risk (the
excess of the amount payable at death, without regard to qualified additional
benefits, over the cash value) assumed to exist at any time cannot exceed the
net amount at risk existing when the contract was issued. 4 2 Second, the
maturity date of the contract is the latest maturity date permitted under the
contract, but this date cannot fall less than twenty years after the contract is
issued, or age ninety-five if earlier. 43 Third, the amount of any endowment
benefit (the benefit payable if the insured survives to the contract's maturity
date) cannot exceed the smallest death benefit at any time, from the issue date
to the maturity date, that was used as the future contractual benefit assumed
44
in computing the guideline premiums.
The rules also require that adjustments be made to reflect future changes
in benefits. If, after a guideline single premium or a guideline level premium
is calculated, any future or other qualified additional benefits are changed or
premium limitation measures
added on any subsequent date, the guideline
45
must be modified to reflect the change.
For purposes of satisfying the second alternative test for qualification for
section 101(a) tax exclusion, 46 the cash value of a flexible premium life
insurance contract may not exceed the "net single premium" for death
benefits (determined without regard to any qualified additional benefits) at
such time. 4 7 Under the cash value test, the net single premium must be
computed using the most recent mortality table allowed under all state laws
on the date of issuance, and the assumed interest must be based on the
greater of 4% (3% for contracts issued before July 1, 1983) or the minimum
rate or rates guaranteed upon issuance of the contract. 48 The computation
rules articulated with respect to guideline single premiums and guideline
level premiums 4 9 are also applicable to net single premiums, except that the
maturity date referred to in section 101(f)(2)(D)(ii) shall not be earlier than
50
age ninety-five.
The conditions under which a policyholder can use flexible premium life
insurance plans to obtain section 101(a) exemption status are admittedly
circumscribed by the requirements articulated in section 101(f). These
statutory requisites, however, do not foreclose the possibility that investors
can fashion their policies so as to satisfy the tests articulated under section
101(f), thereby invoking the tax benefits provided by section 101(a), while
simultaneously accumulating a substantial cash build-up in the policy. The
rules under section 101(f), in general terms, require that the total sum of the
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

See id. § 101(f)(2)(D).
Id § 101(f(2)(D)(i).
Id. § 101(0(2)(D)(ii).
Id § 101(f)(2)(D)(iii).
Id § 101(O(2)(E).
See supra text accompanying note 34.
l
I.R.C. § 101(f)(3)(G)(i)(ii) (Lawyers Co-op. 1984).
See id. § 101(f)(2)(D)(i)-(iii).
Id § 101(0(3)(G)(iii).
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premiums be limited with respect to the projected death benefits, thereby
ensuring that the contract will offer at least a minimum of pure insurance
protection at all times. Through this provision, Congress sought to reinstate
the historic balance between risk-shifting and tax-sheltered investment
elements. Thus, a policyholder who wishes to build up the cash value of his
policy can achieve this result to the extent that he is willing and able to expand
his pure insurance protection. Despite this limitation, the section 101(f)
requirements seem flexible enough that a prudent policyholder can
substantially add funds to his accumulation account as long as he increases
the insurance aspect of his policy. Therefore, although investors interested in
the short-term tax-favored benefits of universal life policies will find it more
difficult to qualify for section 101(a) treatment than they did under the preTEFRA provisions, it is by no means an impossible or unduly burdensome
task, and careful planning, along with the minimum required increase in the
total amount invested, can result in numerous short-term tax advantages.
The new section 101(f) definitional requirements are aimed primarily at
preventing excessive investment in plans which qualify for section 101(a)
treatment but in reality are an accumulation of savings with little or no
insurance element. Section 101(f), however, does not address to what extent
premature withdrawals from the so-called accumulation account may be given
the tax favorable treatment formerly given annuities and presently given
withdrawals from universal life under section 72(e)(5)(C). Although it is
apparent that abusive early withdrawals previously could be made from
universal life plans, this aspect did not appear to be as salient until TEFRA
imposed restrictions on early withdrawals from annuities. The determination
of whether a given accumulation account qualifies for section 72(e)(5)(C)
treatment rests on whether the amount withdrawn comes from a unitary life
insurance contract. If so, then by its terms, section 72(e)(5)(C) stipulates that
it would receive the favorable treatment provided by the pre-TEFRA section
72. If the account is separable from the life insurance contract, however, then
early withdrawals may be taxed under standard section 72(e) and (q)
provisions or may be taxable as ordinary interest income.
The Code's ambiguity could be clarified at any time if the IRS were to take
advantage of the invitation extended under section 72(e)(5)(C) to prescribe
regulations which would apply the penalty provisions of section 72(e) to
section 101 policies. Notwithstanding this invitation and section
101(f)(3)(A), 5 1 the Code does not give any guidance on the issue of
separability. Commentators have also avoided the question, merely stating
that accumulation accounts do qualify for favorable treatment, but failing to
say why or to what extent. 52 The remainder of this note argues that
separability is still an unresolved question, but that the Code is porous
51. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
52. See, e.g., Chiechi & Adney, An Analysis of the Effects of the Life Insurance and Annuity Provisions of
TEFRA, 57J. TAX'N 338, 340-41 (1982); Hira, TEFRA Restrictions on Annuities: A Way to Avoid Them, 62
TAxEs 10, 11-12 (1984).
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enough to allow many different types of accumulation accounts and early
withdrawals to qualify for such favorable treatment that the effectiveness of
the section 72(e) changes is seriously compromised.
1. Section 1O1(f)(3)(A) and Case Law. The plain language of section 101
indicates that the characterization of a policy for purposes of determining
whether tax preferential treatment will be afforded to a given policy turns on
an application of state law. The Code provides that
[tJhe terms "flexible premium life insurance contract" and "contract" mean a life
insurance contract (including any qualified additional benefits) which provides for the
payment of one or more premiums which are not fixed by the insurer as to both timing
and amount. Such terms do not include that portion of any contract which is treated
53
under State law as providing any annuity benefit other than as a settlement option.

Thus, the treatment of a given policy under applicable state law will be
determinative for section 101 purposes, and the factors state courts have used
to distinguish annuity contracts from insurance contracts must be examined in
order to predict how such policies are to be treated under the Code.
According to the Conference Committee report, if a flexible premium
contract is treated under state law as a single, integrated contract, it will be
treated as a single contract for section 101 purposes. 54 Courts have applied
traditional contract analysis to insurance policies and accordingly have held
that insurance purchasing is governed by contract law principles and that such
policies are to be tested by principles applicable to the making of contracts in
general. 55 Thus, it seems relatively easy for an issuing company or a
prospective policyholder effectively to mandate a judicial interpretation of a
policy as a single contract by sufficiently linking the accumulation account to
the policy's pure insurance protection in contract terms. In this way, the
accumulation account will ride on the coattails of the insurance portion of the
agreement, and the entire policy will fall within the protective ambit of section
101.
The only remaining question is whether, given the apparent abuses of such
policies, their potential for contravening the legislative intent, and their
similarity to annuities, the courts are likely to interpret such a policy, with its
accumulation account, as universal life insurance. The statutory language
seems to compel such a result. 56 Moreover, the case law, which is rich in
conflicts among parties over whether a given arrangement constitutes an
insurance or annuity contract, indicates that universal life policies, along with
their accompanying accumulation accounts, are likely to be interpreted as
57
insurance for purposes of section 101 coverage.
53.

I.R.C. § 101(f)(3)(A) (Lawyers Co-op. 1984).

54. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 760, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. at 649, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws at 1419.
55. See, e.g., Roscoe v. Bankers Life Ins. Co., 22 Ariz. App. 282, 284, 526 P.2d 1080, 1082
(1974); Little v. Barry, 417 A.2d 966, 967 n.2 (D.C. 1980); Woseca Mut. Ins. Co. v. Noska, 331
N.W.2d 917, 926 (Minn. 1983).
56. I.R.C. § 72(e)(5)(C) (Lawyers Co-op. 1984).

57.

See infra notes 58-66 and accompanying text.
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State courts have articulated numerous factors which they have used in
determining whether a given agreement constitutes an insurance or an
annuity contract. There appears to be a general judicial consensus "that
contracts for annuities differ from life insurance policies," 5 8 although courts
often acknowledge that the two plans are, in effect, opposites, 5 9 or at least
distinctly different. 60 One factor which is characteristic of all annuity
contracts is the existence of an agreement by the company to pay fixed
periodic payments, either for life or for a term of years, to the policyholder. 6 1
Insurance policies, alternatively, are not characterized by the payment of fixed
periodic payments. One court has summarized the commonly accepted
notion of life insurance: "It is an agreement wherein the insured makes a
payment or, more usually, agrees to make periodic payments . . . to an
insurance company, in return for which, upon his death, it agrees to pay to
those persons whom he designates as beneficiaries a definite sum of money
"62

The notion of risk inherent in both insurance and annuity contracts is of
central importance in distinguishing the two. Each type of policy presents a
type of risk, but "It]he risks assumed under life insurance policies and under
annuity contracts are diametric opposites." 63 One court has specified that
for a contract to be one of insurance it is essential that there be hazard and a shifting
of the incidence [of risk]. If there is no risk, or if there be one and it is not shifted to
another or
others [i.e., shifted away from the policyholder], there can be no
64
insurance.

Corbin is in substantial agreement, and expands on this notion: "In life
insurance, the insured wins his wager, and the insurer loses, if death occurs
soon and before many premiums have been paid. . . . In annuity cases, the
58. Corporation Comm'n v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 73 Ariz. 171,
175, 239 P.2d 360, 362 (1951); see also SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65, 71 (1959).
59. See, e.g., In re Estate of Newton, 177 Misc. 877, 886, 32 N.Y.S.2d 473, 481 (1941), afdmem.,
267 A.D. 913, 48 N.Y.S.2d 332 (1944).
60. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Howell, 29 NJ. 116, 121, 148 A.2d 145, 148 (1959);
Bayer's Estate, 345 Pa. 308, 311, 26 A.2d 202, 205 (1942).
61. See Cranley v. Schirmer, 27 Conn. Supp. 258, 263-64, 236 A.2d 332, 335 (1967); Wolfe v.
Breman, 69 Ga. App. 813, 818, 26 S.E.2d 633, 637 (1943); In re Weill's Will, 113 Ind. App. 99, 10607, 45 N.E.2d 362, 365 (1942); In re Estate of Johnson, 238 Iowa 1221, 1226, 30 N.W.2d 164, 167
(1947); Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 223 Iowa 333, 335, 271 N.W. 899, 900 (1937);
Succession of Rabouin, 201 La. 227, 235, 9 So. 2d 529, 531 (1942); Everett v. Commissioner of
Corps. & Tax'n, 317 Mass. 612, 614, 59 N.E.2d 186, 187 (1945); Commissioner of Corps. & Tax'n v.
Hale, 315 Mass. 556, 558, 53 N.E.2d 675, 676 (1944); Gregg v. Commissioner of Corps. & Tax'n,
315 Mass. 704, 707, 54 N.E.2d 169, 171 (1944); Dalton v. Florence Home for the Aged, 154 Neb.
735, 737, 49 N.W.2d 595, 597 (1951); Tobler v. Moncrief, 72 N.J. Super. 48, 51-52, 178 A.2d 105,
107 (1962); Moore v. O'Cheskey, 87 N.M. 66, 66-67, 529 P.2d 292, 292-93 (1974); Bronson v.
Glander, 149 Ohio St. 57, 59, 77 N.E.2d 471, 472 (1948); McNally v. Evatt, 146 Ohio St. 443, 446, 66
N.E.2d 633, 635 (1946); In re Dwight's Estate, 389 Pa. 520, 525, 134 A.2d 45, 48 (1957); Hunter v.
First Nat'l Exch. Bank, 198 Va. 637, 643-44, 96 S.E.2d 104, 108 (1957).
62. Dary v. Walsh, 132 Conn. 5, 12, 42 A.2d 366, 369 (1945), cited with approval in New Britain
Nat'l Bank v. Life Ins. Co., 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 674, 677-78, 305 A.2d 296, 298 (1972).
63. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v Howell, 29 N.J. 116, 121, 148 A.2d 145, 148; see also
Corporation Comm'n v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 73 Ariz. 171, 179, 239
P.2d 360, 365; Cruthers v. Neeld, 14 N.J. 497, 505, 103 A.2d 153, 157-58 (1954).
64. Estate of Barr, 104 Cal. App. 2d 506, 508, 231 P.2d 876, 878 (1951).
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holder of the policy wins his wager, and the company loses, if the holder lives
-65 The Supreme Court has also identified the element of
a long time ...
risk-shifting as inherent in the distinction between insurance and annuity
66
plans.
Other courts have articulated the distinction between annuity and
insurance policies not in terms of the type of risk inherent in each, but in
terms of an investment as opposed to an indemnity. "[A]nnuities are not
indemnities for death but are investments for life. They are designed as
safeguards against misfortune and want during the life of the annuitant and
are essential [sic] provisions for life and not provisions for death." 6 7 In short,
insurance contracts provide against the contingency of death, while annuities
with no indemnity feature are provisions for life. 6 8 Federal courts, in their
review of annuity and insurance policies, have found the same factors to be
determinative in distinguishing between the two types of policies. 69 The
70
commentators are essentially in accord.
When analyzing universal life insurance policies in light of the foregoing
factors, it appears evident that such contractual arrangements are more
closely akin to insurance policies than to traditional annuity plans. As
indicated in the definition of universal life insurance articulated earlier, 7 ' no
fixed periodic payments are promised by the company to the insured. This
element has consistently been held to be decisive in determining whether a
given plan qualifies as an annuity. 7 2 But universal policies, like life insurance
plans generally, do require that the policyholder make periodic payments to
the company, although section 101(f) indicates that such payments "are not
[to be] fixed by the insurer as to both timing and amount." 73 Furthermore,
the understanding that the beneficiaries of the insured will receive a
previously agreed-upon payment after the death of the policyholder is implicit
74
in the basic premise of universal life plans, as in all life insurance policies.
The nature of universal life insurance policies displays an inherent
element of risk on the part of the insurer. As with all insurance policies, the
company exposes itself to the risk that the policyholder will die before the
65.

3A A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CoNRacrs § 731 (1960).

66. See Commissioner v. Le Gierse, 312 U.S. 531, 539 (1941).
67. Corporation Comm'n v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 73 Ariz. 171,
175-76, 239 P.2d 360, 362; see also Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Howell, 29 NJ. 116, 121, 148 A.2d
145, 148; Daniel v. Life Ins. Co., 102 S.W.2d 256, 260 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
68. In re Estate of Sothern, 170 Misc. 805, 808-09, 14 N.Y.S.2d 509, 512 (1938).
69. See NLRB v. Rice Lake Creamery Co., 365 F.2d 888, 893 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Iglehart v.
Commissioner, 174 F.2d 605, 606 (7th Cir. 1949); Bodine v. Commissioner, 103 F.2d 982, 984 (3d
Cir. 1939); Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 102 F.2d 380, 382 (1st Cir. 1939); Stowe
Township v. Standard Life Ins. Co., 363 F. Supp. 341, 343 (W.D. Pa. 1973); Silberman v. United
States, 333 F. Supp. 1120, 1126 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
70. See generally A. CORBIN, supra note 65, § 731; 1 J. APPLEMAN & J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW
AND PRACTICE § 83 (1981).
71.

See supra text accompanying note 29.

72.
73.
74.

See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
I.R.C. § 101(f)(3)(A) (Lawyers Co-op. 1984).
See id § 101(a)(1).
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payment of substantial premiums. Furthermore, the insurance amount test 75
helps preserve this element of risk. The required benefit amount will be lower
when the policyholder is young and there will be an escalation in the cost of
the insurance as the risk of mortality becomes greater. Although the
incidence of risk diminishes, this sliding scale approach is designed so that the
actual risk coverage will be comparable to that provided by whole life
insurance, which similarly decreases with time. This requirement also ensures
that the policy will at all times provide a reasonable minimum amount of pure
76
insurance protection throughout the duration of the policy.
The other tests set forth in section 101(f) to determine whether section
101(a) treatment can be granted to a given universal life policy reinforce the
proposition that such insurance plans will possess many of the attributes of
more traditional insurance contracts. The guideline premium test 7 7 provides
for some equivalency between universal life and whole life policies. The
guideline single premium 78 and guideline level premium 79 tests seek to
ensure that a policyholder will not invest more in his universal life policy than
he would have invested had he purchased a whole life insurance plan
providing comparable benefits. Under the TEFRA restrictions, the guideline
single premium is comparable to the premium required to fund single
premium whole life, and the guideline level premium represents the
cumulation of premiums that would have been paid into a traditional policy.
By imposing this artificial ceiling on investment and by providing for a builtin, albeit diminishing, risk factor, TEFRA ensures that only a universal life
policy which has sufficient attributes as an insurance policy will qualify as life
insurance and receive tax-exempt status under section 101(a).
An important consideration remains in determining whether universal life
insurance policies will qualify for section 101(a) treatment. It is well settled
that the incidence of taxation is governed by the substance rather than the
form of a transaction.8 0 Thus, when a policy is scrutinized to determine its
character for tax purposes, courts have consistently noted that "a label placed
upon an agreement by the parties thereto need not be determinative of its
character." 8 1 It has been considered an affirmative duty of the court to
scrutinize the substance of agreements so as to "rest their applications upon
8 2
the realities."
75. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
76. S. REP. No. 494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. at 354, reprinted in 1982 U.S.
at 1089.
77. I.R.C. § 101(f)(2)(A) (Lawyers Co-op. 1984).
78. Id. § 101(f)(2)(B).

CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS

79. Id. § 101(f)(2)(C).
80. See, e.g., Diedrich v. Commissioner, 457 U.S. 191, 195 (1982); Old Colony Trust Co. v.
Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716, 729 (1929); TSN Liquidating Corp. v. United States, 624 F.2d 1328,
1331 (5th Cir. 1980).
81. Bodine v. Commissioner, 103 F.2d 982, 984 (3d Cir. 1939); see also Commissioner v. Meyer,
139 F.2d 256, 258 (6th Cir. 1943).
82. Commissioner v. Meyer, 139 F.2d 256, 258 (6th Cir. 1943).
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The courts' preoccupation with ascertaining the true nature of insurance
policies stems from an overarching concern with congressional intent and a
recognition that judicial interpretations should promote the legislative
policies underlying the statutory language.8 3 The longstanding judicial
practice of reviewing the substance of transactions in tax cases arose out of a
desire to avoid subverting the purpose of the Code.8 4 The Supreme Court
has shared this concern, noting that
[t]he incidence of taxation depends upon the substance of a transaction. . . . The
transaction must be viewed as a whole . . . . To permit the true nature of a
transaction to be disguised by mere formalisms, which exist solely to alter tax
liabilities, 8would
seriously impair the effective administration of the tax policies of
5
Congress.

As discussed above, the TEFRA provisions in section 72 of the Code were
designed to eliminate the incentive for short-term investors to use annuity
contracts as a vehicle for tax evasion. Similarly, the amendments to section
101 are intended to avoid giving deferral and section 101(a) benefits to what
are essentially investment accounts, that is, accounts which lack significant risk
shifting. If, as has been postulated, universal life insurance agreements are
such that a. policyholder can take advantage of the relative flexibility of such
contracts (although some limits do exist8 6 ) while simultaneously falling within
the section 101 (a) tax exemptions, he or she can, in effect, sidestep the section
72 restrictions and the accompanying legislative policy considerations. As
long as the section 101(f) requirements are met, however, section 101(a)
treatment will be granted. "The legal right of a taxpayer to decrease the
amount of what otherwise would be his taxes, or altogether avoid them, by
means which the law permits, cannot be doubted." 8 7 Furthermore, "the
existence of a tax benefit resulting from a transaction does not automatically
make it a sham as long as the transaction is imbued with tax-independent
considerations." 8 8 Clearly, tax-independent considerations existed in
TEFRA's treatment of universal life policies, namely, Congress' desire to
encourage traditional life insurance contracts as well as flexible premium life
insurance plans that are substantially comparable to traditional contracts.8 9
Unfortunately, Congress seems to have failed in its efforts to eliminate the
potential for the abuse of such policies as short-term tax shelters. Thus,
section 101 universal life policies are still open to some of the abuses of preTEFRA section 72, in that the policyholder may accumulate premiums and
earnings in a sheltered account, then withdraw them tax free when a better
opportunity presents itself.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
United
89.

See id at 259.
Bercy Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner, 640 F.2d 1058, 1062 (9th Cir. 1981).
Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 334 (1945).
See generally supra text accompanying notes 32-50.
Gregory v. Commissioner, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935).
Holladay v. Commissioner, 649 F.2d 1176, 1179 (5th Cir. 1981); see also Frank Lyon Co. v.
States, 435 U.S. 561, 583-84 (1978).
See S. REP. No. 494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. at 361, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWs at 1096.
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2. Analogous Regulations. The question whether any specified policy
combining an insurance element and a savings fund arrangement is to be
viewed for tax purposes as a single insurance contract or is to be broken up
into its component parts is an area ripe for administrative guidance. Congress
extended an apparent invitation for the IRS to draft regulations in this area, 90
ostensibly to protect against the abuses that the TEFRA changes in section 72
supposedly cured. Yet Treasury Regulations have not been promulgated in
response to this invitation regarding private insurance policies. While, in the
absence of regulations, case law provides the most authoritative guidelines, it
would seem natural to argue by analogy from other parts of the Code and
Regulations which definitively address this problem in other contexts.
a. Estate tax. Treasury Regulations for the estate tax deal directly with the
question of combination plans. The applicable regulation provides explicit
definitions for classification of a policy at the death of the policyholder:
A combination annuity contract and life insurance policy on the decedent's life . . .
which matured during the decedent's lifetime so that there was no longer an insurance
element under the contract at the time of the decedent's death is subject to the
provisions of section 2039(a) and (b). On the other hand, the treatment of a
combination annuity contract and life insurance policy on the decedent's life which did
not mature during the decedent's lifetime depends on the nature of the contract at the
time of the decedent's death. . . . If the decedent dies before the reserve value equals
the death benefit, there is still an insurance element under the contract. The contract
is therefore considered, for estate tax purposes, to be an insurance policy ....
However, if the decedent dies after the reserve value equals the death benefit, there is
no longer an insurance element under the contract. The contract is therefore
considered to be a contract for an annuity or other payment . ... 91

In other words, for estate tax purposes, any contract which has an element of
insurance in it qualifies as an insurance policy. The annuity or savings fund
arrangement is ignored for purposes of the initial classification. Analogizing
that regulation to the income tax treatment of annuity or savings fund
arrangements in universal life policies seems logically compelling. Of course,
the bare existence of any insurance element would not be sufficient to classify
a policy as life insurance under section 101, for section 101 (f) requires more
than a de minimis degree of risk. If a policy fulfills the statutorily mandated
minimal risk requirements under section 101(f), the existence of insurance
risk should, as in estate tax, qualify the plan as a single contract entirely under
section 101. The accumulation account would therefore qualify for taxfavored treatment under section 72(e)(5)(C).
90.

See I.R.C. § 72(e)(5)(C) (Lawyers Co-op. 1984). Section 72(e)(5) exempts life insurance and

endowment contracts from the stricter early withdrawal provisions imposed by TEFRA, subject to

§ 72(e)(5)(C). Thus, if regulations were promulgated by the IRS imposing the stricter withdrawal
provisions on life insurance and endowment contracts, they would not be overruled by any explicit
provision of the Code. Section 101(f)(3)(A) does not, in any way, mandate the application of state

law if that law would exempt the annuity or savings fund proceeds from income tax. Section
101 (f)(3)(A) only explicitly prohibits exempting the savings fund or annuity account from income in
the case of death of the policyholder. Presumably then, any Treasury Regulation subjecting an
accumulation account to the new section 72(e) provisions would override state law, even if that state
law viewed the policy as one contract.
91. Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-1(d) (1976).
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As compelling as this argument may sound, the general rule is that estate
and gift taxes and income taxes are not interpreted in pari materia, since their
underlying purposes are frequently dissimilar. 92 Predictably, the IRS has
been quick to dismiss the validity of the analogy in this case and has found
that Treasury Regulation section 20.2039-1(d) should be a definitional
statement for estate tax only. The IRS argues that since life insurance
proceeds are includable in the gross estate under section 2042 and annuities
are includable under section 2039, "characterization of a policy as either a life
insurance contract or as an annuity contract will not necessarily prevent the
application of the estate tax." 9 3 The implication of this argument is that since
the policy will be taxed under either section, it is merely an arbitrary
administrative convenience to apply a bright-line rule. The IRS argument
fails to consider that sections 2039 and 2042 are indeed different and that
annuities are subject to many exemptions to which life insurance proceeds are
not, 94 indicating that there are some legitimate parallels between the estate
and income tax schemes. Nonetheless, the similarities between parallel estate
and income tax provisions are not given much weight in facilitating their
interpretation.
b. Qualified pension plan regulations. Examining the tax treatment of
combination annuity and life insurance plans purchased and distributed by
qualified employee trusts and pension plans provides further insight. It is
noted at the outset that the applicable sections, by their own terms, refer only
to qualified employee plans. 9 5 Once again, though, in the absence of any
regulation or code section specifying treatment of universal life policies,
analogous sections may receive close scrutiny from the courts.
The pertinent regulations provide that
(i) . . .certain payments under employee plans are taxable under section 72....
For purposes of applying section 72 to [qualified employee trusts and plans] each
separate program of the employer consisting of interrelated contributions and benefits
shall be considered a single contract. Therefore, all distributions or payments . . .
which are attributable to a separate program of interrelated contributions and benefits
are considered as received under a single contract.
(ii) . . .[R]etirement benefits and life insurance will be considered part of a single
separate program of interrelated contributions and benefits to the extent they are
income, endowment, or other contracts providing life
provided under retirement
96
insurance protection.

92. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303, 306-07 (1945); Farid-es-Sultaneh v.
Commissioner, 160 F.2d 812, 814-15 (2d Cir. 1947). In Wemyss, the Court, for gift tax purposes,
interpreted "gifts" in its broadest and most comprehensive sense and found a gift even where
consideration, in the form of detriment, had been given. The Court used an objective, external test
to find a gift and refused to allow subjective donative intent to be determinative. For income tax
purposes in Farid-es-Sultaneh, however, the court interpreted "gift" very narrowly and found no gift
because there was no subjective donative intent, despite the fact that the consideration was not
monetary or necessarily fair.
93. G.C.M. 38934 (July 9, 1982).
94. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-1(b)-(d) (1976).
95. As defined by I.R.C. § 401 (Lawyers Co-op. 1983 & Supp. 1985).
96. Treas. Reg. § 1.72-2(3)(i)-(ii) (1966).
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Here again, the effect of this regulation is to qualify all benefits of a policy as
insurance proceeds as long as there is an element of insurance in the pension
plan context. Analogous treatment of privately purchased policies would lead
to treating any policy which qualified under the flexible life requirements of
section 101(f) as a single contract and thus eligible for favorable section
72(e)(5)(C) tax treatment. As expected, the IRS has indicated that it does not
concur in such a view and that these regulations should be strictly construed
to apply only to the pension plan context. Moreover, the IRS argues that with
qualified plans, section 72(m)(3)(C) limits the section 101 exclusion upon
death and therefore that it is not necessary in the pension area to separate a
policy into its component parts. 9 7 Section 72(m)(3)(C), however, addresses
only tax treatment at death and says nothing of early withdrawal from such
plans. Arguably, therefore, a statute which makes special provisions for
qualified plan participants only upon death should have no bearing on early
withdrawal tax treatment and private annuity plans which parallel pension
plans in these respects should receive analogous treatment.
As in the estate tax area, however, parallels between sections of the Code,
in and of themselves, do not mandate an identical result. Moreover, courts
are understandably hesitant to import substantive elements of other sections
into an exclusion from income. Nonetheless, the analogous sections of the
Code which allow plans combining insurance and other elements to be
treated as insurance policies indicate that Congress and the IRS have been
willing to classify many multifaceted plans as insurance in the name of
administrative convenience while conceding the tax advantages such a
classification inevitably spawns. This point, when considered in connection
with the gaps contained in the Code which must be filled by contract law,
might lead a court to the conclusion that early withdrawals from a carefully
drafted life insurance policy containing a savings fund or annuity element
must be excluded from income so long as it is a return of capital.
V
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

From the foregoing materials, it is clear that there are many different types
of accumulation accounts within a universal life insurance policy which may
qualify for section 72(e)(5) tax treatment. Although an increase in the
insurance protection is required to bolster the amount that may be withdrawn
from the accumulation account, it is still likely that such an account could be
very similar to a regular savings account or a pre-TEFRA annuity contract.
Congress' original intent to prevent long-term investment vehicles from being
used as short-term tax shelters may once again be circumvented.
The courts, as a result, are likely to feel somewhat uncomfortable with
enforcement of the TEFRA provisions in such a way as to serve the legislative
intent in only a very minimal way. In consideration of the previous materials,
97.

G.C.M. 39022 (March 31, 1983); G.C.M. 38934 (July 9, 1982).
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though, the present Code and Regulations leave the judiciary little choice. To
effect Congress' purposes, the courts may look toward the Code's "escape
hatch" provision which indicates that regulations may be prescribed by the
Secretary9" to bring accumulation accounts within section 72(e)(2) or other
general income provisions. This solution could be easily promulgated by the
IRS and appears to be the most expeditious method to effectuate
congressional intent.

98.

I.R.C. § 72(e)(5)(C) (Lawyers Co-op. 1984).

